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LEFT BEHIND: THE PATERNALISTIC 
TREATMENT OF STATUS OFFENDERS WITHIN 
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last half century, the juvenile justice system has changed 
dramatically. Through changes to legislation,
1
 various state and federal 
court decisions,
2
 and attitudinal changes,
3
 juvenile offenders are 
increasingly being afforded rights that were once reserved for adult 
offenders. Youth offenders are now given procedural due process rights,
4
 
the right to have their voices heard,
5
 and, in some states, the right to a trial 
by jury.
6
 Despite this overall shift in the approach to juvenile justice, there 
are still some parts of the system that have failed to make the adjustment. 
Status offenders are a primary example of such a group.
7
 Status offenses 
are a classification of transgressions committed by juveniles ―that would 
not be a crime if committed by an adult.‖8 Typical examples of status 
offenses include: truancy,
9
 running away,
10
 curfew violations,
11
 and 
ungovernability.
12
 The nature of these offenses—that they are not 
considered criminal—makes it so that status offenders are afforded neither 
procedural due process rights nor the opportunity to voice their interests. 
 
 
 1. See infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.  
 2. See infra notes 61–89 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 90–99 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 63–85 and accompanying text.  
 5. See infra notes 90–99 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 7. In addition to status offenders, the juvenile justice system has jurisdiction over delinquents 
and dependent youth. A ―juvenile delinquent, is a youth who has committed an offense deemed illegal 
regardless of the offender‘s age.‖ Tiffany Zwicker Eggers, Note, The “Becca Bill” Would Not Have 
Saved Becca: Washington State’s Treatment of Young Female Offenders, 16 LAW & INEQ. 219, 227 
(1998). A dependent youth (sometimes referred to as an abused or neglected child) ―is a juvenile 
needing protection from an unfit guardian.‖ Id. at 227. 
 8. Cheryl Dalby, Note, Gender Bias Toward Status Offenders: A Paternalistic Agenda Carried 
Out Through The JJDPA, 12 LAW & INEQ. 429, 437 (1994). Different jurisdictions may use different 
labels for status offenders, including Children in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS), Children in 
Need of Supervision (CHINS), Persons in Need of Supervision (PINS), or Unruly Child. See, e.g., 
ALA. CODE § 12-15-1 (LexisNexis 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.007 (West 2007); N.Y. FAM. CT. 
ACT § 712 (McKinney 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022 (West 2005).  
 9. See infra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.  
 10. See infra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.  
 11. See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.  
 12. See infra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.  
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Rather, the nature of status offenses allows courts to exercise paternalism
13
 
and use their discretion in determining the disposition of the child, 
including whether the child committed an offense and how the child 
should be treated.
14
  
This Note examines the juvenile justice system‘s paternalistic attitude 
towards status offenders and observes that while the juvenile justice 
system as a whole has moved towards greater autonomy and voice for 
youth offenders, the system‘s treatment of status offenders has failed to 
keep up. Part I presents a broad overview of the history of the juvenile 
justice system, as well as a more detailed description of status offenders. 
Part II discusses various changes made to the juvenile justice system over 
the last fifty years and the overall shift towards greater autonomy for 
youth offenders. It describes changes made through federal legislation, 
federal and state court decisions, and general attitudinal changes. Part III 
addresses the ways status offenders have been left behind in the juvenile 
justice system‘s movement and how they are continually deprived of the 
same rights and autonomy as other youth offenders. It traces the history of 
status offenders within the juvenile justice system and presents a case 
study of female status offenders to demonstrate the ways in which status 
offenders are subject to paternalism at the discretion of juvenile court 
judges. Finally, Part IV offers suggestions to afford status offenders the 
same autonomy and rights as other youth within the juvenile justice 
 
 
13. Paternalism is defined as ―[a] government‘s policy or practice of taking responsibility for the 
individual affairs of its citizens, esp. by supplying their needs or regulating their conduct in a heavy-
handed manner.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1163 (8th ed. 2004); see also Dalby, supra note 8, at 430 
n.10 (quoting GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 239–40 (1986)) (defining paternalism).  
Paternalism, or more accurately Paternalistic Dominance, describes the relationship of a 
dominant group, considered superior, to a subordinate group, considered inferior, in which the 
dominance is mitigated by mutual obligations and reciprocal rights. The dominated exchange 
submission for protection, unpaid labor for maintenance. In its historical origins, the concept 
comes from family relations as they developed under patriarchy, in which the father held 
absolute power over all the members of his household. In exchange, he owed them the 
obligation of economic support and protection. The same relationship occurs in some systems 
of slavery; it can occur in economic relations, such as the padrone system of southern Italy or 
the system used on some contemporary Japanese industries. As applied to familial relations, it 
should be noted that responsibilities and obligations are not equally distributed among those 
to be protected: the male children‘s subordination to the father;s [sic] dominance is 
temporary; it lasts until they themselves become heads of households. Daughters can escape it 
only if they place themselves as wives under the dominance/protection of another man. The 
basis of ‗paternalism‘ is an unwritten contract for exchange: economic support and protection 
given by the male for subordination in all matters, sexual service and unpaid domestic service 
given by the female. 
Id. 
 14. For purposes of this Note, the term ―child‖ is used synonymously with minor, youth, and 
juvenile.  
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system. The Note concludes that status offenders must either be provided 
greater rights and protections within the current structure or they must be 
removed as a whole from the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
A. Historical Background  
In the late eighteenth century in the United States, a single court system 
handled both adult and child criminal offenders.
15
 Children age seven and 
older were considered competent to stand trial in criminal court and if 
convicted, subject to various ―prison sentences or even the death 
penalty.‖16 In the late nineteenth century, Progressives began pushing for 
reform in the criminal justice system.
17
 In particular, ―[a] specific group of 
Progressives, [referred to as] the ‗child savers,‘‖ concentrated on juvenile 
offenders because of their belief that ―juvenile offenders as a group [were] 
in need of care and guidance, not punishment.
18‖ This call for reform 
prompted the creation of the juvenile court system.
19
  
 
 
 15. Lauren A. Barnickol, Note, The Disparate Treatment of Males and Females Within the 
Juvenile Justice System, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 429, 431 (2000). The system used the ―same trial 
procedures, sentencing guidelines, and prison facilities‖ for both adult and youth offenders. Id.   
 16. Id. at 431. During this time, the courts exempted children under the age of seven from 
prosecution because they ―were presumed to lack the requisite mens rea to commit a criminal offense.‖ 
Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis The Menace or Billy The Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to 
Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 375 (1998).   
 17. Barnickol, supra note 15, at 431. Progressives refer to activists during the Progressive era, ―a 
broadly based reform movement‖ lasting between the 1890s and 1920s. In response to changes 
brought about by industrialization and urbanization, ―[P]rogressives advocated a wide range of 
political, economic, and social reforms.‖ Encyclopedia.com, Progressivism Facts, Information, 
Pictures, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/progressivism.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
 18. Klein, supra note 16, at 376. The view of the ―child savers‖ was summed up by the Supreme 
Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), as follows:  
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that 
children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals. 
They were profoundly convinced that society‘s duty to the child could not be confined by the 
concept of justice alone. They believed that society‘s role was not to ascertain whether the 
child was ―guilty‖ or ―innocent,‖ but ―What is he, how has he become what he is, and what 
had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward 
career.‖ The child—essentially good, as they saw it—was made ―to feel that he is the object 
of [the state‘s] care and solicitude,‖ not that he was under arrest or on trial.  
Klein, supra note 16, at 376; see also Eggers, supra note 7, at 226–27 (noting that ―[t]he Progressives 
saw themselves as child-savers and their courts as benign, non-punitive, and therapeutic‖).  
 19. For a more detailed description of the history leading up to the establishment of the juvenile 
court, see Sacha M. Coupet, Comment, What To Do With The Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The Role of 
Rhetoric and Reality About Youth Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the Juvenile Justice 
System, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 1308–13 (2000). 
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In 1899, Illinois established the first juvenile court in the United 
States.
20
 The court was created with the goal of treating offending youth 
―in order to prevent future delinquent behavior rather than punish them for 
breaking the law.‖21 The philosophy rested on the assumption that children 
were less developed than adults and thus should not be held to the same 
level of accountability.
22
 Additionally, it was believed that children were 
more capable of change and could be treated.
23
 Because of this focus on 
rehabilitation, the original juvenile court system adopted the principle of 
parens patriae.
24
 This doctrine gave judges broad discretion to consider 
each child‘s needs individually and to determine the appropriate 
disposition and treatment for each offender.
25
 By the late 1920s, almost 
 
 
 20. Sandra M. Ko, Comment, Why Do They Continue To Get The Worst Of Both Worlds? The 
Case For Providing Louisiana’s Juveniles With The Right To A Jury In Delinquency Adjudications, 12 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 161, 164 (2004). The court was established in Cook County, 
Illinois, through the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 131 §§ 1–21. Ko, supra note 20, at 164 
n.17.  
 21. Id. at 164; see Coupet, supra note 19, at 1312 (noting that the job of the juvenile court judge 
was to use his discretion to provide assistance to a minor who might otherwise begin a life of crime).  
 22. Ira M. Schwartz et al., Myopic Justice? The Juvenile Court and Child Welfare Systems, 564 
ANNALS 126, 128 (1999); see also Earl F. Martin & Marsha Kline Pruett, The Juvenile Sex Offender 
and the Juvenile Justice System, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 279, 280 (1998) (stating that ―[t]he basic 
doctrine of this new court was that ‗children—even children who broke the criminal law—differed 
from adults,‘ and therefore ‗required not only separate but different treatment before the law‘‖) 
(quoting ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST LAID PLANS 3 (1978)); Martin, supra note 22, at 314–15 (stating 
that juveniles ―are less capable than adults of making consistently sound judgments or moral 
distinctions‖ and ―describing the developmental stages of cognitive functioning with respect to legal 
reasoning, internalization of social and legal expectations, and ethical decision making.‖); Coupet, 
supra note 19, at 1312–13 (noting that children entering the juvenile courts were assumed to be 
relatively innocent). 
 23. Ko, supra note 20, at 164; see Schwartz, supra note 22, at 128 (stating that juvenile court was 
founded on the belief that ―children are in the midst of developing emotionally, morally, and 
cognitively, and therefore, are psychologically impressionable and behaviorally malleable‖).  
 24. Ko, supra note 20, at 164–65. Parens patriae is defined as ―[t]he state regarded as a 
sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.‖ 
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004); see also Coupet, supra note 19, at 1308 (noting that 
parens patriae ―generally refers to the role of the state as the custodian of persons who suffer from 
some form of legal disability. It authorizes the state to substitute and enforce its judgment about what 
it believes to be in the best interests of the persons who presumably are unable to take care of 
themselves‖); Klein, supra note 16, at 376 (describing parens patriae as the doctrine ―whereby the 
state had an affirmative duty to intervene to care for ‗its least fortunate citizens‘‖) (quoting ANTHONY 
M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 3–4 (1977)); Erin M. Smith, Note, 
In A Child’s Best Interest: Juvenile Status Offenders Deserve Procedural Due Process, 10 LAW & 
INEQ. 253, 257 (1992) (defining parens patriae as ―the right of the state to take control of children 
whose parents were unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities or of children who pose a threat 
to the community‖).  
 25. Ko, supra note 20, at 165; see Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and 
Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 
1098 (1991) (quoting an early judge describing his role as ―[t]he problem for determination by the 
judge is not, has this boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but what is he, how has he become what 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss4/4
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every state had passed a statute similar to that of Illinois and created its 
own juvenile court system.
26
  
At their inception, the juvenile courts did not have any of the 
procedural protections of the adult criminal court because the proceedings 
were technically considered civil and because the advocates of the juvenile 
court system believed the protections to be unnecessary and undesirable.
27
 
Juvenile court personnel believed that the court‘s rehabilitative purpose 
made the formal protections of due process unnecessary.
28
 The juvenile 
court advocates preferred for the court to be an informal atmosphere where 
the judge could speak with the child and determine the most appropriate 
disposition and treatment for the juvenile offender.
29
 The process was 
intended to be ―more of an information-gathering and problem-solving 
session to serve the best interests of the child, [rather] than an adversarial-
type of proceeding as seen in a criminal court.‖30  
B. Status Offenders  
The civil, rehabilitation-focused nature of the juvenile justice system 
allowed the courts to assert jurisdiction over both criminal and 
noncriminal behavior. Youth classified as status offenders ―fall under the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts because they have committed a non-
 
 
he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a 
downward career.‖).     
 26. Ko, supra note 20, at 164.  
 27. Id. at 165. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated in In re Holmes, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), 
that ―juvenile courts are not criminal courts, the constitutional rights granted to persons accused of 
crime are not applicable to children brought before them.‖ Id. at 525.  
 28. Hon. W. Don Reader, The Laws of Unintended Results, 29 AKRON L. REV. 477, 479 (1996); 
see also Ainsworth, supra note 25, at 1100 (stating that procedural formalities were not wanted in the 
juvenile court system because informality was thought to encourage rehabilitation).  
 29. Ko, supra note 20, at 165; see Smith, supra note 24, at 258 (stating ―in order to meet the 
‗best interests‘ of the child, intervention needed to be informal and individualized‖).  
 30. Janet Gilbert et al., Applying Therapeutic Principles to a Family-Focused Juvenile Justice 
Model (Delinquency), 52 ALA. L. REV. 1153, 1161 (2001); see Klein, supra note 16, at 377 (discussing 
use of separate terminology and procedures for juvenile offenders to protect them ―from the stigma of 
adult prosecutions‖). The goals of the juvenile courts have also been described as follows:  
The child who must be brought into court should, of course, be made to know that he is face 
to face with the power of the state, but he should at the same time, and more emphatically, be 
made to feel that he is the object of its care and solicitude. The ordinary trappings of the 
court-room are out of place in such hearings. The judge on a bench, looking down upon the 
boy standing at the bar, can never evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk, with the 
child at his side, where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad 
to him, the judge, while losing none of his judicial dignity will gain immensely in the 
effectiveness of his work.  
Gilbert, supra note 30, at 1160 (internal citation omitted). 
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criminal act that is considered unacceptable solely because of their age.‖31 
Despite the noncriminal nature of the offenses, juvenile courts have 
jurisdiction over status offenders because of the state‘s legitimate interest 
in protecting its youth, whether through punitive or rehabilitative 
treatment.
32
 Additionally, juvenile courts believed jurisdiction over status 
offenders was proper based on an escalation theory that ―status offenses 
will lead to more serious forms of delinquency‖ and ―[e]arly intervention 
[was] needed to help children and prevent future delinquency.‖33 Status 
offenses are often difficult to chronicle and assess as they are matters of 
state law.
34
 There are, however, some common offenses that are likely to 
lead a court in most states to classify a child as a status offender.
35
 These 
offenses include the specific offenses of truancy, running away, and 
 
 
 31. Tracy J. Simmons, Note, Mandatory Mediation: A Better Way to Address Status Offenses, 21 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1043, 1046 (2006). In most states, the cut-off age for status offenses is 
eighteen years of age. Soma R. Kedia, Note, Creating an Adolescent Criminal Class: Juvenile Court 
Jurisdiction Over Status Offenders, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL‘Y & ETHICS J. 543, 550 (2006).  
 32. Howard T. Matthews, Jr., Comment, Status Offenders: Our Children’s Constitutional Rights 
Versus What’s Right for Them, 27 S.U. L. REV. 201, 202 (2000).  
 33. Simmons, supra note 31, at 1044–45; see Alecia Humphrey, The Criminalization of Survival 
Attempts: Locking Up Female Runaways and Other Status Offenders, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN‘S L.J. 
165, 184 (describing status offenses as a gateway into the juvenile justice system and noting that the 
committing of status offenses is a signal that a child needs assistance).  
 34. Kedia, supra note 31, at 544. Depending on the state, the statutes may be part of the state‘s 
family code or child welfare law. Id. at 545. Every state in the United States has some form of status 
offense legislation. Matthews, supra note 32, at 202.  
 35. A typical example of a status offender statute provides:  
A status offender is an individual who has been charged with or adjudicated for conduct that 
would not, pursuant to the law of the jurisdiction in which the offense was committed, be a 
crime if committed by an adult. An adjudicated status offender who violates the terms of his 
or her probation or aftercare remains a status offender for purposes of Section 12-15-208, 
unless the child is contemporaneously adjudicated for having committed a delinquent act that 
is not a status offense. Status offenses include, but are not limited to, the following: 
a. Truancy. 
b. Violations of municipal ordinances applicable only to children. 
c. Runaway. 
d. Beyond control. 
e. Consumption or possession of tobacco products. 
f. Possession and consumption of alcohol, which is a status offense by federal law, even 
though considered a delinquent act by state law. 
g. Driving under the influence pursuant to Section 32-5A-191(b), which is a status offense 
by federal law, even though considered a delinquent act by state law. 
ALA. CODE 1975 § 12-15-1 (LexisNexis 2005). For other examples of status offense statutes, see, e.g., 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-120 (West 2009); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 15-11-2 (2008); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. § 730; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119 § 21 (West 
2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-3; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02 (Vernon 2008); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16.1-228 (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss4/4
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curfew violations, as well as a more general ―catch all‖ offense for 
―unruly,‖ ―incorrigible,‖ or ―disobedient‖ behavior.36  
Truancy refers to a youth‘s unexcused absences from school.37 The 
rationale for punishing this behavior as a status offense is that truancy is 
often seen as a ―gateway‖ to further criminal behavior as truants often skip 
school to participate in crime of some sort.
38
 Additionally, if a student is 
habitually truant, it is more likely that the student will ―drop out of school, 
which generally results in decreased economic opportunity.‖39 Because of 
these results and the underlying public policies, truancy remains a criterion 
for adjudication as a status offender.
40
  
Another common status offense is running away.
41
 The National 
Incidence Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway, and Thrownaway 
Children defines a runaway as any one of the following:  
[a] child [who] leaves home without permission and stays away 
overnight; [a] child 14 years old or younger (or older and mentally 
incompetent) who is away from home chooses not to come home 
when expected to and stays away overnight; [or] a child fifteen 
years old or older who is away from home chooses not to come 
home and stays away two nights.
42
  
Running away is included as a status offense as it will often lead to more 
serious criminal activity.
43
  
Curfew violations are also considered a status offense in many 
localities.
44
 Curfew violations occur when a minor breaks an ordinance 
that imposes restrictions on the hours during which the youth may be out 
 
 
 36. See generally Kedia, supra note 31, at 545–49.  
 37. NATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOOL ENGAGEMENT, WHAT IS TRUANCY?, http://www.school 
engagement.org/TruancypreventionRegistry/Admin/Resources/Resources/TruancyFactSheet.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2009). 
 38. Kedia, supra note 31, at 547–48. But see id. at 554–55 (stating that ―unfulfilled educational 
needs,‖ academic anxiety, such as when ―a student may stay home from school in order to avoid 
stressful situations like oral presentations‖ or as a result of ―an undiagnosed learning disability,‖ or 
academic climate, such as ―problematic relationships with peers or teachers,‖ may contribute to a 
youth being truant).  
 39. Kedia, supra note 31, at 548.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 546.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. Many commentators, however, criticize punishing running away as a status offense 
because many times the reason why youth run away is because of abuse—physical, sexual, emotional, 
or psychological. Running away often serves as a ―coping mechanism for dealing with and attempting 
to end the abuse.‖ Id. at 554. See generally Humphrey, supra note 33, at 175–78 (discussing the 
presence and effects of abuse in many runaway cases).  
 44. Kedia, supra note 31, at 548. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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in public.
45
 Many cities enacted these laws ―as a way to curb juvenile 
crime.‖46 Research has demonstrated a correlation between active 
enforcement of these laws and a decrease in juvenile crime.
47
    
In addition to these specific offenses, many status offense statutes 
contain general ―catch all‖ sections, referring to ―disobedient,‖ 
―incorrigible,‖ or ―ungovernable‖ children who are ―beyond the control of 
their parents‖ (hereinafter ―ungovernable‖).48 Although varying by state, a 
typical catch all provision will state that a parent can refer a youth for 
court supervision if he or she ―is an habitual truant or is incorrigible, 
ungovernable, or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of 
his parents, guardian or lawful custodian.‖49 As demonstrated by the 
language of the statute, no specific criteria define the behaviors contained 
within the catch all sections of status offense laws, and, thus, parents can 
refer children as ungovernable for an assortment of behaviors, including 
―habitual disobedience of family rules about anything from staying out 
late to engaging in sexual relations.‖50 Because the activities and behaviors 
constituting ungovernability are ill-defined, parents and judges have broad 
discretion in referral and enforcement of this status offense.
51
  
II. CHANGES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MOVE TOWARDS 
GREATER AUTONOMY  
Despite the best intentions of the founders and advocates of the 
juvenile justice system, by the 1960s there were calls to reform the system 
on account that it had failed in its goal of rehabilitating youth offenders.
52
 
 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 549. Despite the success of these ordinances, these laws have been ―controversial in 
terms of their possible infringement on minors‘ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.‖ Id. at 548; 
see also id. at 548 n.26 (listing sources discussing the conflicts over curfew laws); Matthews, supra 
note 32, at 205–08 (discussing various state and federal court cases on the constitutionality of curfew 
violations but noting that the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue).  
 48. Jan C. Costello & Nancy L. Worthington, Incarcerating Status Offenders: Attempts to 
Circumvent the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 41, 45 
(1981) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.002 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-7.1 
(1977)). 
 49. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 732(a) (1962).  
 50. Kedia, supra note 31, at 546.  
 51. Costello, supra note 48, at 45; see OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OJJDP FACT SHEET, PETITIONED STATUS OFFENSE 
CASES IN JUVENILE COURTS 2 (2004) (showing that relatives referred youth more for the status offense 
of ungovernability than for other offenses).   
 52. See Gilbert, supra note 30, at 1163 (discussing the report, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND 
YOUTH CRIME by the PRESIDENT‘S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss4/4
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Critics ―questioned the effectiveness of the system‘s treatment techniques‖ 
and its ―rehabilitative capacity.‖53 It soon became clear that ―the juvenile 
court, despite its stated rehabilitative goals, punishes children in much the 
same way as the adult system.‖54 Many states recognized this shift and 
embraced a more punitive approach to adjudicating minors.
55
 In response 
to the increasingly punitive approach of many juvenile courts, youth 
advocates turned their attention to providing youth offenders with legal 
rights and protections.
56
 Ironically, this switch to a more punitively 
focused juvenile justice system led to greater autonomy for most youth 
offenders.  
A. Federal Legislation 
The recognition of the juvenile justice system‘s shift towards an 
increasingly punishment-oriented model is reflected in various federal 
laws.
57
 In 1974, Congress enacted the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act (JJDPA) which was aimed at reforming and standardizing 
state juvenile justice systems.
58
 Among the changes required by the JJDPA 
included the deinstitutionalization of status offenders, the separation and 
removal of juvenile offenders from adult offenders in jails and other 
institutional settings, and addressing disproportionate minority 
confinement.
59
 The legislation required the federal government to provide 
 
 
JUSTICE, which ―raised serious questions about fundamental premises of the juvenile justice system 
and its effectiveness‖).  
 53. Barnickol, supra note 15, at 434; see Gilbert, supra note 30, at 1164 (quoting the Supreme 
Court‘s decision in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), in which the Court expressed concerns 
over the state of the juvenile justice system in 1967, saying ―[t]here is much evidence that some 
juvenile courts, including that of the District of Columbia, lack the personnel, facilities and techniques 
to perform adequately as representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect 
to children charged with law violation‖).  
 54. Dalby, supra note 8, at 435.  
 55. Id. at 435–36; see, e.g., Barnickol, supra note 15, at 435 & nn.39–41 (describing new 
juvenile-related laws regarding juvenile court jurisdiction, transfer to adult court, and mandatory 
sentencing—which all reflected the shift to a more punitive approach).  
 56. Ko, supra note 20, at 166; see Coupet, supra note 19, at 1314 (describing critics‘ assertions 
that the juvenile courts ―harmed children by denying them necessary constitutional protections and by 
exposing them to the risk of judicial whim.‖). 
 57. See infra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
 58. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, § 102, 88 Stat. 
1110, 1110–11 (1974). During debates the articulated purposes of the JJDPA were stated as 
―‗develop[ing] effective methods of preventing and reducing juvenile delinquency, diverting juveniles 
from the juvenile justice system, and providing critically needed alternatives to incarceration.‘‖ Dalby, 
supra note 8, at 440 n.90 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 25, 162 (1974)).  
 59. Building Blocks for Youth, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act Fact Sheet, 
http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/issues/jjdpa/factsheet.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).  
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resources to assist the states in achieving these goals.
60
 Recognizing the 
shift to an increasingly punitive approach by the juvenile courts, Congress 
passed the JJDPA with the goal of providing greater protections to youth 
offenders.    
B. Federal and State Court Cases 
Recognizing the shift to a punitive model and the corresponding need 
for greater legal rights, beginning in 1966 the Supreme Court handed 
down several rulings that formalized juvenile court procedures.
61
 These 
cases ―enumerated the constitutional rights retained by juveniles during 
adjudication,‖ including many due process procedural protections, and 
restricted the discretion of juvenile court judges.
62
  
The Supreme Court first took notice of the juvenile justice system‘s 
shortcomings in the case of Kent v. United States.
63
 In this case, the Court 
considered whether a juvenile court‘s failure to hold a hearing on the 
waiver of jurisdiction violated sixteen-year-old Morris Kent‘s due process 
rights.
64
 The Court held that Kent had been denied his due process rights 
when the trial judge failed to hold a hearing prior to transferring him to 
adult court.
65
 In deciding this case, the Court warned the states not to view 
the doctrine of parens patriae as ―an invitation to procedural 
arbitrariness.‖66 Additionally, the Court indicated its concerns regarding 
the then-current state of the juvenile court system when it noted, ―there 
may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both 
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the 
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.‖67  
The year following Kent v. United States, the Court decided the 
landmark juvenile rights case In re Gault.
68
 A juvenile court sentenced 
fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault to an institution ―for the period of his 
 
 
 60. Barnickol, supra note 15, at 447. In providing resources to assist with the 
deinstitutionalization of status offenders, the JJDPA required states to develop community-based 
alternatives for youth offenders. Id. at 448.  
 61. See id. at 434 n.35 (listing Supreme Court cases that ―increased the due process rights of 
juvenile offenders, in effect making juvenile court processes more similar to those used in [adult] 
criminal court‖); see also infra notes 63–85 and accompanying text.  
 62. Ko, supra note 20, at 167; see Coupet, supra note 19, at 1314–16 (analyzing the evolution of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the constitutional rights of juvenile offenders).  
 63. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).  
 64. Id. at 552. 
 65. Id. at 552–54.  
 66. Id. at 555. 
 67. Id. at 556.  
 68. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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minority‖ for making lewd phone calls to a neighbor.69 On appeal, Gault 
alleged that the juvenile court denied him of numerous constitutional 
rights at his adjudication hearing.
70
 In its analysis of the case, the Supreme 
Court reviewed and rejected several of the historical rationales for the lack 
of protections and rights for juvenile offenders.
71
 The Court recognized 
that ―unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently 
a poor substitute for principle and procedure.‖72 In response to these 
concerns, the Court held that many rights afforded to adult criminal 
defendants under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
should extend to juvenile offenders.
73
 These rights include the right to 
notification of the charge,
74
 the right to representation by counsel,
75
 the 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
76
 and protection against 
self-incrimination.
77
 The Court emphasized the importance of due process 
to all proceedings—whether for adults or juveniles—stating that due 
process is ―the primary and indispensable foundation of individual 
freedom.‖78 Furthermore, the Court noted that ―it would be extraordinary 
if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the 
exercise of care implied in the phrase ‗due process.‘ Under our 
Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo 
court.‖79  
Following Gault, the Court continued to make decisions extending 
various rights and protections to juveniles. In the case of In re Winship,
80
 
the Court held that a state must meet the stricter ―proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt‖ standard, rather than the preponderance of evidence 
standard, in order to adjudicate a minor as delinquent for committing a 
criminal act.
81
 Despite the idea that juvenile proceedings were civil in 
nature, the Court held that ―the Due Process Clause protects the accused 
 
 
 69. Id. at 7–8. The same offense, if committed by an adult, would be a misdemeanor that carried 
a fine of $5 to $50 or imprisonment for a maximum of two months. Id at 8–9.  
 70. Id. at 10 (claiming that the court denied him the right to notice of the charges, the right to 
counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
right to a transcript of the proceedings, and the right to appellate review of the case).  
 71. Id. at 14–27.  
 72. Id. at 17–18.  
 73. Id. at 30–59.  
 74. Id. at 31–34.  
 75. Id. at 34–42. 
 76. Id. at 42–57. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 20. 
 79. Id. at 27–28. 
 80. 397 U.S. 358 (1980).  
 81. Id. at 367.  
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against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.‖82 
Additionally, in Breed v. Jones,
83
 the Supreme Court held that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause prevented the reprosecution of a youth in adult criminal 
court after the youth had already been tried in juvenile court.
84
 Echoing its 
observations from Kent and Gault, the Court noted that ―it is clear under 
our cases that determining the relevance of constitutional policies, like 
determining the applicability of constitutional rights, in juvenile 
proceedings, requires that courts eschew ‗the ‗civil‘ label-of-convenience 
which has been attached to juvenile proceedings,‘ and that ‗the juvenile 
process . . . be candidly appraised.‘‖85 Therefore, the Court determined 
that youth offenders needed to be afforded the same or similar rights and 
protections as adult criminal offenders.  
In addition to these constitutional mandates from the Supreme Court to 
extend certain rights to juveniles, some state courts have taken a role in 
granting even more rights to juvenile offenders. For example, in June 2008 
the Kansas Supreme Court granted juveniles the right to a jury trial in In 
the Matter of L.M.
86
 Involving a sixteen-year-old charged with aggravated 
sexual battery, the court held that changes to the Kansas Juvenile Justice 
Code eroded the differences between the juvenile and adult criminal 
systems such ―that juveniles have a constitutional right to a jury trial under 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.‖87 Additionally, the court stated 
that the proceedings under the Kansas Juvenile Justice Code established 
juveniles‘ right to a jury trial under the Kansas Constitution.88 Although 
the Supreme Court first rejected the right to a jury trial for juvenile 
offenders in the 1971 case of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
89
 this contrary 
holding of the Kansas Supreme Court points to a potential shift in 
thinking, which could result in a different outcome should a case regarding 
the issue again reach the Supreme Court.  
 
 
 82. Id at 364.  
 83. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).  
 84. Id. at 541.  
 85. Id. at 529 (quoting Gault, 387 U.S. at 21, 50) (citation omitted).  
 86. 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008). 
 87. Id. at 170.  
 88. Id. at 172.  
 89. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
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C. Attitudinal Changes: Best Interests v. Stated Interests  
In addition to being afforded procedural due process rights, in the last 
half century youth offenders have been given a greater voice within their 
adjudications.
90
 Attorneys for juveniles have long debated the best way to 
represent children.
91
 The two most common approaches attorneys take to 
juvenile representation are (1) to advocate based on the best interests of 
the child (hereinafter ―best-interests approach‖)92 or (2) to advocate based 
on the expressed interests of the child (hereinafter ―expressed-interests 
approach‖).93 The best-interests approach advocates based on a third 
party‘s opinion and conclusions as to what is best for the child, derived 
from the third party‘s observations.94 Proponents of the best-interests 
approach rest their belief on the theory that minors lack the capacity to 
make reasoned decisions.
95
 By contrast, the expressed-interests approach 
advocates for the minor to voice his or her opinion and preferences with 
regard to the adjudication.
96
 Proponents of the expressed-interests 
approach actively seek and respect the juvenile‘s input and perspective.97 
The expressed-interests approach empowers juvenile offenders and 
provides them with greater decision-making power in their adjudication.
98
 
Despite these differing approaches, there appears to be agreement among 
juvenile defenders that the expressed-interests approach is the proper way 
to advocate for the juvenile offenders.
99
 Modern studies indicate that 
minors possess strong preferences and understanding of their own personal 
 
 
 90. See infra notes 91–99 and accompanying text. 
 91. Aditi D. Kothekar, Note, Refocusing the Lens of Child Advocacy Reform on the Child, 86 
WASH. U. L. REV. 481, 484 (2008). 
 92. Id. at 482.   
 93. ROBIN WELKER STERLING ET AL., NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER, ROLE OF 
JUVENILE DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DELINQUENCY COURT 10 (2009), available at http://www.njdc. 
info/pdf/role_of_juvenile_defense_counsel.pdf.  
 94. Kothekar, supra note 91, at 493.  
 95. Id.; see also Francis Gall Hill, Clinical Education and the “Best Interest” Representation of 
Children in Custody Disputes: Challenges and Opportunities in Lawyering Pedagogy, 73 IND. L.J. 
605, 623 (1998) (stating that ―[b]est interest representation is consistent with society‘s notion that 
children have not attained the full measure of cognitive skills, maturity, and judgment necessary for 
autonomous decisionmaking.‖).  
 96. STERLING, supra note 93, at 7. 
 97. Id. at 8.  
 98. Id. at 9. 
 99. Id. at 7; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Talking About Children’s Rights In Judicial 
Custody and Visitation Decision-Making, 36 FAM. L.Q. 105, 123 (2002) (stating that ―[i]n recent 
years, a number of commentators have called for judicial recognition of a much larger role for 
children‘s preferences, perhaps at least in part influenced by greater acceptance of general autonomy 
for children . . .‖); Kothekar, supra note 91, at 484–86 (discussing the move towards a client-directed 
model of child advocacy in dependency proceedings).  
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needs.
100
 The shift from a best-interests approach to an expressed-interests 
approach represents another way in which the juvenile justice system is 
moving towards greater autonomy for youth offenders.  
The federal statutes, Supreme Court decisions, and attitudinal changes 
of juvenile-court personnel were important changes to the juvenile justice 
system.
101
 As youth offenders were being adjudicated in the same manner 
as adult offenders with a focus on punishment as opposed to rehabilitation, 
additional legal rights were necessary. The changes to the juvenile justice 
system in the last half century finally recognized the need for youth 
offenders to be provided with various procedural rights and protections 
and a certain degree of autonomy in their adjudications.  
III. STATUS OFFENDERS LEFT BEHIND 
Since the 1960s, the state of the juvenile justice system has shifted to 
provide youth offenders with greater procedural protections and a louder 
voice in their adjudications. Juvenile courts must now provide juvenile 
offenders with the right to notification of the charge, the right to 
representation by counsel, as well as numerous other procedural due 
process rights.
102
 Additionally, during adjudication, juvenile defenders are 
encouraged to advocate using the expressed-interests approach, rather than 
the best-interests approach.
103
 These changes in the juvenile justice system 
signal a shift towards affording more rights and greater autonomy to youth 
offenders. These changes, however, have not been extended to all classes 
of juvenile offenders. Status offenders are denied procedural due process 
rights and continue to be ―subject[ed] to more flexible and informal 
procedures under the parens patriae notion.‖104 Thus, once a status 
 
 
 100. The consensus among several scholars ―is that adolescents in the mid-teenage years between 
fourteen and sixteen, have the understanding and decisional capacity of young adults.‖ Randy Frances 
Kandel & Dr. Anne Griffiths, Reconfiguring Personhood: From Ungovernability To Parent 
Adolescent Autonomy Conflict Actions, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 995, 1044 (2003). Additionally, ―a 
substantial body of psychological research specifically focused on adolescent decisional capacity 
regarding legal matters . . . indicates that people in their mid teenage years understand, analyze, and 
decide like young adults and differently from younger subjects.‖ Id. at 1045–46.  
 101. See supra notes 57–99 and accompanying text.  
 102. See supra notes 63–85 and accompanying text.  
 103. See supra notes 90–99 and accompanying text.  
 104. Simmons, supra note 31, at 1048; see Smith, supra note 24, at 258 (noting that ―Gault 
expressly limited its holding to the adjudicatory hearing for a child determined to be delinquent.‖). The 
view that status offenders should be treated according to the rehabilitative approach results from the 
fact that status offenders do not actually commit crimes. This reasoning, however, is flawed because 
―[a]lthough courts attempt to justify the denial of procedural protections by stating that these children 
receive less punitive dispositions, the courts‘ treatment of status offenders is not solely rehabilitative 
since committing noncriminal behavior twice can ultimately provide the basis for incarceration.‖ 
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offender is referred to the juvenile justice system, he or she is denied the 
right against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and the proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt standard.
105
 The denial of these and other rights is 
especially troubling because the legal criteria for certain status offenses are 
very vague.
106
 The lack of clarity in these statutes allows for a great deal of 
discretion for juvenile court judges.
107
 It is because of this large degree of 
discretion that status offenders are particularly susceptible, and in fact 
often fall victim to, paternalistic practices.
108
 Despite this susceptibility to 
paternalism, the juvenile court system continues to deny status offenders 
various legal rights and a voice in their adjudications.  
A. History of Status Offenders Within the Juvenile Justice System 
At various times throughout the history of the juvenile justice system 
there have been attempts to provide status offenders with greater legal 
rights and protections. The states are largely inconsistent in dealing with 
status offenders.
109
 In most cases, however, state courts have denied status 
offenders additional rights and protections and continued to differentiate 
between delinquents and status offenders.
110
  
The case of In re Spalding
111
 illustrates a court‘s denial of rights to 
status offenders. Cindy Spalding was charged with the status offense of 
being ungovernable and beyond the control of her parents for allegedly 
engaging ―in acts of sexual intercourse and sexual perversion with an 
unknown number of male and female adults for a period of more than one 
year.‖112 Spalding attempted to assert her right against self-incrimination, 
but the court denied her from asserting this right stating that ―since 
[Spalding] was not charged with an act which, in the circumstances of this 
case, would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, the privilege of 
 
 
Smith, supra note 24, at 260; see infra notes 126–30 and accompanying text (discussing the Valid 
Court Order Amendment).  
 105. Kedia, supra note 31, at 559. In some states, status offenders may also be denied access to a 
guardian ad litem. Id. at 559 n.116.  
 106. Id. at 558. In particular, the catch all sections of status offender statutes are very vague and 
unclear. See supra notes 50–51 and infra notes 133–44 and accompanying text.  
 107. Kedia, supra note 31, at 559. 
 108. See infra notes 133–44 and accompanying text. 
 109. Smith, supra note 24, at 259–60. 
 110. Humphrey, supra note 33, at 168.  
 111. 332 A.2d 246 (Md. 1975).  
 112. Id. at 248 n.2. Cindy Spalding was thirteen when her parents brought her to the hospital for 
drug overdoes and rape. An adult male would give Spalding and her friends a pill before his parties, 
where all would engage in sexual intercourse. The adult male threatened to kill the girls if they told 
anyone about the parties. Id. at 248. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
858 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:843 
 
 
 
 
self-incrimination is not applicable to these proceedings.‖113 The Spalding 
court believed that the category of status offenses should be insulated 
―from the consequences of an adjudication of delinquency‖ and that ―the 
creation of the category of [status offenses] . . . insures that treatment of 
children guilty of misconduct peculiarly reflecting the propensities and 
susceptibilities of youth, will acquire none of the institutional, quasi-penal 
features of treatment . . . .‖114 Accordingly, ―providing Fifth Amendment 
rights would establish a penal atmosphere,‖ in contrast to the purported 
goal of rehabilitation of status offenders.
115
 Ultimately, Spalding was 
adjudicated in need of supervision as a status offender and committed to 
an institution for treatment.
116
 This case clearly illustrates the ways in 
which status offenders are disadvantaged through the denial of the 
procedural due process rights which are provided to delinquent juveniles 
and adult offenders.
117
   
Recognizing that status offenders were treated differently from 
delinquents and denied access to certain legal rights, in 1974 Congress 
passed the JJDPA.
118
 Among its requirements, the JJDPA federally 
mandated the deinstitutionalization of status offenders.
119
 In accordance 
with the mandate, courts began to process status offenders differently from 
other delinquents.
120
 Despite positive initial results, judges gradually 
became frustrated with their inability to punish status offenders under the 
JJDPA.
121
 A common scenario was one in which judges ordered runaways 
 
 
 113. Id. at 257. The Supreme Court, in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), laid out a two-prong test to 
determine whether constitutional rights applied to juveniles. First, the proceeding must be to adjudicate 
delinquency. Second, the delinquency must be such that it could result in commitment to a state 
institution. The Maryland court found Spalding ineligible for the right against self-incrimination 
despite the Gault Court‘s statement that ―[i]t would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-
incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children.‖ Gault, 387 U.S. at 49. The 
Spalding court responded that the Supreme Court‘s holding that the constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination was applicable to juveniles ―was referring to a proceeding to determine 
‗delinquency‘ . . . .‖ In re Spalding, 332 A.2d at 253. 
 114. Id. at 252.  
 115. Smith, supra note 24, at 262. 
 116. In re Spalding, 332 A.2d at 249. Because this case was decided before the enactment of the 
JJDPA, Spalding was sent to an institution for treatment. See supra notes 57–60 and 119–30 (the 
JJDPA mandated the deinstitutionalization of status offenders). But see infra notes 123–30 (discussing 
the techniques many juvenile-court personnel used to get around the JJDPA as well as the Valid Court 
Order Amendment).  
 117. Dalby, supra note 8, at 440.  
 118. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
 119. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  
 120. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 136. 
 121. Humphrey, supra note 33, at 169–70. Early on, the JJDPA appeared to have positive effects 
for status offenders. By 1988, status offender detentions had decreased by ninety-five percent. Id. 
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to stay in unlocked facilities, only to have the youth run away again.
122
 
Because of their frustrations with these types of situations, judges began to 
use a practice known as ―bootstrapping‖ in which they placed a status 
offender in secure detention when the child was found in contempt of a 
court order.
123
 Alternatively, another method of bootstrapping was called 
―relabeling‖ in which the state charged a status offender with a low-level 
criminal offense, instead of a status offense, so that he or she could be 
detained.
124
 Despite the fact that institutionalizing status offenders was 
technically against the law, many judges took it upon themselves to find 
ways to place these young offenders in secure detention based on what 
they believed was best for the youth.
125
   
In 1980 juvenile court judges lobbied Congress for an amendment to 
the JJDPA that would create an exception to the ―no secure detention‖ 
provision for status offenders and which would essentially legalize the 
bootstrapping and relabeling actions that were already being employed to 
place status offenders in secure detention.
126
 In response to the judges‘ 
efforts, Congress enacted a new provision known as the Valid Court Order 
Amendment.
127
 This amendment allows judges to place status offenders in 
 
 
 122. Id. at 170.  
 123. Joyce London Alexander, Aligning the Goals Of Juvenile Justice With The Needs Of Young 
Women Offenders: A Proposed Praxis For Transformational Justice, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 555, 564 
(1999); see also Barnickol, supra note 15, at 450 (describing the practice of bootstrapping in greater 
detail).  
 124. Alexander, supra note 123, at 564; see also Barnickol, supra note 15, at 451 (discussing how 
juvenile courts used relabeling to detain status offenders); David J. Steinhart, Status Offenses, THE 
JUVENILE COURT, Winter 1996, at 91, available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr_doc/ 
vol7no3ART7.pdf (stating that studies indicate that in reaction to deinstitutionalization laws, children 
are being relabeled as delinquents so they can be housed in secure detention facilities, or are being 
―involuntarily and inappropriately committed to in-patient treatment facilities and psychiatric 
hospitals‖). In addition to bootstrapping and relabeling, states circumvented the JJDPA‘s mandate of 
deinstitutionalization in other ways: 
―Although status offenders were removed from secure facilities, their numbers were offset by 
the incarceration of more young people for minor and petty delinquent acts. Moreover, there 
is evidence that many status offenders, as well as other troubled children were propelled into 
private impatient psychiatric and substance abuse facilities where they were essentially 
confined against their will with virtually no legal protections.‖ 
Simmons, supra note 31, at 1048–49 (quoting Wanda Mohr et al., Shackled in the Land of Liberty: No 
Rights for Children, 564 ANNALS 37, 40 (1999)).  
 125. Humphrey, supra note 33, at 170 (noting that judges participated in bootstrapping because of 
their belief that status offenders needed to be in secure confinement).  
 126. Id. at 171.  
 127. Pub. L. No. 96-509, 94 Stat. 2750 (1980). Representative John Ashbrook proposed the Valid 
Court Order Amendment. The amendment passed by a vote of 239 to 123. Judges played an 
instrumental role in getting the Valid Court Order Amendment through Congress. In hearings in front 
of the House of Representatives, Judge John Milligan, speaking on behalf of the National Council of 
Juvenile and Family Court Judges, emphasized the need for the amendment to protect youth from 
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detention if they violate a valid order of the juvenile court.
128
 The practical 
result of the 1980 Valid Court Order Amendment is that ―a judge can issue 
an order requiring a status offender to stay at home, live in foster care, 
attend counseling, or any of several other dispositions . . . .‖ Additionally, 
the Amendment ―allows the juvenile court to [legally] place the child in a 
secure detention or correctional facility‖ if the juvenile violates a court 
order.
129
 Despite this change to the JJDPA, which punishes status 
offenders in basically the same way as juvenile delinquents, status 
offenders continue to be denied the due process rights provided to those 
facing delinquency charges.
130
  
While the initial enactment of the JJDPA in 1974 seemed to recognize 
the different position of status offenders and attempted to carve out a 
separate sphere for these youth by mandating deinstitutionalization, the 
1980 Valid Court Order Amendment effectively prevented the mandate 
from being realized.
131
 Status offenders were left in a position similar to 
delinquents—in that they could be incarcerated—but without the same 
rights or voice in their adjudications.
132
 The juvenile justice system has 
refused to extend the same legal rights or voice to status offenders as they 
 
 
society. ―Judge Milligan‘s comments reflect the paternalistic view that guides many juvenile court 
judges.‖ Dalby, supra note 8, at 443. For more information on the debate and vote on the Ashbrook 
amendment, see 126 CONG. REC. 30, 214–38 (1980).  
 128. Pub. L. No. 96-509. The 1980 amendment provided, in part that ―[j]uveniles who are charged 
with or who have committed offenses that would not be criminal if committed by an adult or offenses 
which do not constitute violations of valid court orders . . . shall not be placed in secure detention 
facilities or secure correctional facilities.‖ (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (a)(12)(A) (1988); see 
Smith, supra note 24, at 275–81 (discussing cases addressing secure confinement in detention facilities 
for violation of court ordered dispositions resulting from status offenses). The Valid Court Order 
Amendment and the ability of judges to incarcerate status offenders are especially troubling because of 
the indeterminate nature of juvenile sentencing. Because juvenile sentencing laws are extremely 
vague, judges are given a great deal of discretion and a juvenile who violates a court order can be 
incarcerated for years at a time. Dalby, supra note 8, at 442.  
 129. Dalby, supra note 8, at 441–42. On July 31, 2008, the U.S. Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary marked-up and passed, by voice vote, S. 3155, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Reauthorization Act of 2008, bipartisan legislation to reauthorize the JJDPA. As part of the 
JJDPA Reauthorization Act, Congress confirmed the use of the Valid Court Order Amendment but 
instituted a phase-out plan for the use of the valid court order over a three-year period, with a one- to 
two-year hardship extension for those states that need additional time to make needed changes. 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Reauthorization Act, S. 3155, 110th Cong. (2008).  
 130. Kedia, supra note 31, at 559.  
 131. See supra notes 58–60 and 127–29 and accompanying text; see also Patricia J. Arthur & 
Regina Waugh, Status Offenses and the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act: The 
Exception that Swallowed the Rule, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 555, 560 (2009) (noting that ―the use 
of the [valid court order] exception has, over time, substantially undermined the act‘s original goal of 
eliminating the use of confinement to address status-offender behavior‖). 
 132. See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text. 
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do to juvenile delinquents, and instead has allowed the courts broad 
discretion to look upon these youth with an eye towards paternalism. 
B. Case Study: The Role of Paternalism and Female Status Offenders  
While the adjudication of each of the types of status offenses allows for 
a certain degree of discretion by juvenile court judges, the catch all 
sections regarding ungovernable behavior are especially susceptible to 
broad judicial discretion and paternalism.
133
 In particular, female status 
offenders falling under the catch all section of status offense statutes 
represent perhaps the strongest example of the paternalistic treatment of 
status offenders that results from the denial of procedural due process 
rights and the right to be heard.
134
  
The language of catch all statutes is extremely vague and allows 
juvenile court judges broad discretion in the adjudication of youth based 
on this particular offense.
135
 Courts can find juveniles ungovernable for an 
assortment of behaviors, including ―having sex, . . . disobeying parents, 
‗trashing‘ one‘s room, or staying out late with one‘s friends.‖136 As 
described by one scholar, ―[t]he vague standard, causes cases to turn on 
the personal values . . . and the culturally embedded mores and 
expectations of particular communities about how youths should 
behave.‖137 For young females, the lack of clarity in the catch all statutes 
allows the courts to take a protective approach to their disposition.
138
  
As stated by Professor Poulin, ―[t]he state, like many parents, tend[s] to 
supervise daughters more closely . . . and to demand greater social 
 
 
 133. See supra notes 48–51 and infra notes 134–44 and accompanying text.  
 134. See Kedia, supra note 31, at 552 (noting that ―courts have traditionally taken a ‗protective 
stance‘ toward teenage females and declared them ungovernable for sexual activity. Male judges . . . 
punish females for behavior—sexual behavior in particular—that would not be considered extreme or 
deviant in males‖); see also Humphrey, supra note 33, at 173 (finding that juvenile court judges often 
made ―moral- and sexuality-based judgments‖ about girls but noting that ―without procedural 
protections or lawyers, these types of discretion and gender bias have gone unchecked and are 
involved in some form every step along the way‖); Dalby, supra note 8, at 555 (stating that ―it appears 
that officials with biased judgment continue to perceive a need for intervention in girls‘ lives either to 
save or to punish through the authority of the juvenile court . . .‖). 
 135. Humphrey, supra note 33, at 167. 
 136. Kandel, supra note 100, at 997.  
 137. Id. 
 138. Anne Bowen Poulin, Female Delinquents: Defining Their Place in the Justice System, 1996 
WIS. L. REV. 541, 544–45 (1996) (―[T]he [juvenile] court often exercised jurisdiction over girls 
labeled ‗incorrigible,‘ ‗immoral,‘ or ‗wayward‘ . . . The state undertook their supervision in order to 
correct lifestyle different from that which mainstream society defined as appropriate for a young 
woman.‖). 
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conformity from girls . . . .‖139 Studies indicate that judges continue to 
have sexist, paternalistic attitudes toward young girls.
140
 Courts believe 
that girls must be ―protected‖ from the evils of the outside world.141 A 
story told by one judge recounted ―his salvation of a female status 
offender . . . [and the great] satisfaction [he derived] from the belief that he 
had rescued an adolescent girl from a squalid existence and set her on the 
path to life as an educated member of the middle class.‖142 Because of this 
view, judges continue to perceive a need to intervene in girls‘ lives to save 
the young females through the authority of the juvenile justice system.
143
 
Moreover, as status offenders are not afforded procedural due process 
rights, they have no protections against the paternalistic attitudes of 
juvenile court judges. Thus, despite the juvenile justice system‘s general 
move towards providing youth offenders with greater procedural due 
process rights and a chance to express their stated interests in the process 
of their adjudications, the treatment of status offenders, and female status 
offenders in particular, demonstrates the ways in which paternalism 
continues to exist in the juvenile justice system.
144
  
IV. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE TREATMENT OF STATUS OFFENDERS  
As part of the constituency served by the juvenile justice system, status 
offenders should be provided with the same protections, rights, and 
autonomy given to juvenile delinquents. Status offenders should be 
afforded due process rights and the right to have their stated interests 
heard, rather than have their fates be subject to the broad discretion of 
judges. Several alternatives to the current state of affairs exist which may 
help to bring the treatment of status offenders in line with the general shift 
 
 
 139. Id. at 544; see also Barnickol, supra note 15, at 443 (stating that ―[f]emales have occupied a 
subordinate role within society for many years, and as a result, society expects greater conformity to 
societal norms by young females‖); Eggers, supra note 7, at 237–38 (noting that according to 
stereotypes, ―girls are expected to conform to traditional standards of passivity, chastity and 
obedience‖).   
 140. Dalby, supra note 8, at 446; see id. at 446 n.127 (discussing findings of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts of sexist and discriminatory remarks 
made by juvenile court judges regarding young females).  
 141. Poulin, supra note 138, at 544; see also Humphrey, supra note 33, at 173 (discussing the 
various ways in which juvenile-court personnel believed they were saving young girls); Barnickol, 
supra note 15, at 438–39 (same); Dalby, supra note 8, at 431–34 (same); Eggers, supra note 7, at 239 
(same).  
 142. Poulin, supra note 138, at 542; see also Humphrey, supra note 33, at 173 (noting that judges 
felt it was their responsibility to act to protect female offenders).  
 143. Poulin, supra note 138, at 542.  
 144. See supra notes 133–43 and accompanying text. 
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of the juvenile justice system in the last fifty years. These alternatives 
range from changes within the current existing structure of the juvenile 
courts
145
 to removing status offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
justice system completely.
146
  
A. Changes Within the Current System  
If status offenders are to remain within the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
justice system, the judicial discretion and paternalism of juvenile court 
judges must be curbed. This result may be achieved through numerous 
methods. First, to ensure that status offenders‘ adjudications and 
dispositions are appropriate, the juvenile justice system should formalize 
the adjudication and disposition processes for status offenders.
147
 The 
courts should provide status offenders with the same procedural due 
process rights and protections it provides to juvenile delinquents.
148
 
Providing ―due process rights decrease[s] judicial discretion, making it 
more likely that [status offenders will be] treated equally and fairly.‖149 An 
important procedural right that is currently denied to status offenders is the 
right to counsel.
150
 As recognized by the Supreme Court, access to legal 
representation is possibly the most important procedural right because 
other constitutional rights are more likely to be protected if the juvenile 
has effective counsel.
151
 Moreover, the presence of an attorney increases 
 
 
 145. See infra notes 147–58 and accompanying text.  
 146. See infra notes 159–71 and accompanying text.  
 147. Barnickol, supra note 15, at 455. 
 148. Dalby, supra note 8, at 454.  
 149. Id. at 455. 
 150. Id. ―Children usually do not have the resources available to obtain counsel on their own,‖ 
and, thus, ―the responsibility for providing counsel falls on the juvenile‘s parents. Because status 
offenders are referred to the court by their parents, the parents do not often retain counsel for them.‖ 
Id. at 448–49. ―Recent studies of representation in juvenile courts report that although some states may 
extend the right to counsel to status offenders, these children are represented by attorneys less often 
than those accused of delinquent acts.‖ Smith, supra note 24, at 266; see Humphrey, supra note 33, at 
171–72 (citing one study which found that only twenty-eight percent of status offenders were 
represented by counsel). Some states, however, have succeeded in providing the right to counsel to 
status offenders. See Humphrey, supra note 33, at 181–82 (noting that Massachusetts appoints counsel 
to a child in need of services if he or she does not have the ability to retain counsel him or herself); 
Smith, supra note 24, at 265–66 (citing Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1975)) (the 
Alaska Supreme Court held that because they faced the possibility of detention, status offenders must 
be afforded the due process protection of the right to an attorney).  
 151. The Supreme Court discussed the need for counsel in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967):  
[N]o single action holds more potential for achieving procedural justice for the child in the 
juvenile court than provision of counsel. The presence of independent legal representative of 
the child, or of his parent, is the keystone of the whole structure of guarantees that a minimum 
system of procedural justice requires. The rights to confront one‘s accusers, to cross-examine 
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the likelihood that a youth‘s expressed interests will be heard. As in an 
adult attorney-client relationship, the youth‘s attorney would seek the 
minor‘s input, work to empower the minor to make informed decisions, 
and ultimately represent those interests and decisions.
152
 In addition to 
providing a greater voice to the status offender, the presence of counsel 
could curb judicial discretion and paternalism through the attorney‘s 
knowledge of applicable statutory and case law.
153
 Formalizing court 
procedures for status offenders will help to ensure more equitable case 
adjudications and dispositions and avoid situations in which a judge 
abuses his or her discretion.  
Alternatively, the discretion of juvenile court judges can be minimized 
by refining the statutory definitions of the criteria for status offenses. The 
vague statutory definitions of some status offense violations provide 
juvenile court judges with the opportunity to interpret the offense and to 
adjudicate the youth offenders as they see best.
154
 There have been 
numerous attempts to attack the constitutionality of these status offender 
statutes as void for vagueness; however, these attempts have been met 
with little success.
155
 As noted by one scholar, ―the breadth and ambiguity 
of the [status offender] statutes‘ terms have been regarded as necessary, 
even desirable, devices for identifying and treating children in need of 
care.‖156 While this notion may have been true at the inception of the 
 
 
witnesses, to present evidence and testimony of one‘s own, to be unaffected by prejudicial 
and unreliable evidence, to participate meaningfully in the dispositional decision, to take an 
appeal have substantial meaning for the overwhelming majority of persons brought before the 
juvenile court only if they are provided with competent lawyers who can invoke those rights 
effectively.  
Id. at 38 n.65 (quoting REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT‘S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 86–87 (1967)); see 
Dalby, supra note 8, at 455 n.181 (stating that ―‗[t]he granting of procedural rights can hardly become 
a reality for children without lawyers to assert them on their behalf‘‖) (quoting Sanford Fox, Juvenile 
Justice Reform: A Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1236 (1970)).  
 152. STERLING, supra note 93, at 8.  
 153. For a more detailed discussion of the importance of counsel for status offenders, see 
PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER ET AL., A 
CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN 
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (reprinted 2002), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/cfjfull.pdf. 
 154. See Eggers, supra note 7, at 241 n.173 (asking, ―[w]ho can determine with specificity which 
child is ‗ungovernable,‘ which one is ‗growing up in idleness and vice,‘ or which juvenile is 
‗habitually beyond the control of his or her parents?‘‖) (quoting Orman W. Ketcham, Why Jurisdiction 
Over Status Offenders Should Be Eliminated From Juvenile Courts, 57 B.U. L. REV. 645, 657 (1977)) 
(internal citation omitted).  
 155. Eggers, supra note 7, at 241. For a more detailed discussion on void for vagueness and other 
constitutional challenges to status offense statutes and why they have not been successful, see 
Costello, supra note 48, at 46–50.  
 156. Costello, supra note 48, at 48. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss4/4
  
 
 
 
 
2010] PATERNALISTIC TREATMENT OF STATUS OFFENDERS 865 
 
 
 
 
juvenile justice system, it is no longer true today. The juvenile justice 
system has shifted from a system focused on rehabilitation to one focused 
on punishment—courts are no long treating children, but rather punishing 
them for their wrongdoings.
157
 As a result of this shift, the reasons for 
upholding the vague statutes are no longer valid. Legislators and courts 
must respond to this change and revise status offense statutes to include 
greater detail and specificity regarding what constitutes a particular 
offense.
158
  
B. Removing Status Offenders From the Jurisdiction of the Juvenile 
Courts  
The last, and most extreme, alternative is to remove status offenses 
from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts completely.
159
 As one 
commentator noted, ―no study has shown that status offenders are better 
off because of court supervision. It is possible that the ‗gateway‘ to harder 
crime predicted by the commitment of status offenses may be caused by 
court intervention rather than prevented by it.‖160 As an alternative to the 
juvenile justice system, status offenders should be directed towards 
community-based programs and social services.
161
  
Community-based programs and services are better able than the 
juvenile court system to address the specific ―psychological, emotional, 
 
 
 157. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 158. In particular, this suggestion applies to the status offense of ungovernability. 
 159. Many commentators recognize the desirability of handling status offenders outside the formal 
juvenile justice system. See Robert W. Sweet, Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders: In 
Perspective, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 389, 411 (1991); Barnickol, supra note 15, at 455; Dalby, supra note 8, 
at 451; Smith, supra note 24, at 283.  
 160. Kedia, supra note 31, at 562. Being brought under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice 
system may actually increase the chance of status offenders becoming juvenile delinquents. Status 
offenders are more likely to learn criminal behavior because they are placed in the same institutions as 
juvenile delinquents. Id. at 561.  
 161. JESSICA R. KENDALL, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FAMILIES IN NEED OF CRITICAL 
ASSISTANCE: LEGISLATION AND POLICY AIDING YOUTH WHO ENGAGE IN NON-CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 
(2007). The American Bar Association (ABA) has made the following recommendations for 
establishing community-based alternatives: (1) Identify a single gatekeeper agency to respond to status 
offense referrals. Some state statues require law enforcement officers to contact the agency that 
provides services to status offenders immediately after taking a youth into custody. This provides an 
important and immediate first link between the youth and service provider. (2) Require that pre-court 
diversion services be provided and design a procedure for offering them. (3) Identify a minimum level 
of service the designated agency must provide either directly or through referrals. And (4) require 
monitoring and evaluation of the pre-court services offered to status offenders. Frequent assessments 
ensure that statutory goals are met and available pre-court services respond adequately to youth and 
families at risk of entering the status offense system. Id. at 15–18. 
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and educational needs of status offenders. . . .‖162 Additionally, these 
programs are effective because they integrate the family, and sometimes 
the school, into the rehabilitation of the youth.
163
 For example, one 
program that involves the family in the rehabilitation of the status offender 
is family group conferencing (FGC).
164
 FGCs are ―family-focused, 
strengths-oriented, and community-based processes where parents, older 
children, extended family members, social service professionals and others 
gather and act collectively to work on problems and make decisions for 
and with families.‖165 The programs typically involve the use of mediation 
and negotiation.
166
 By involving multiple parties, FGCs shift the focus 
away from the youth and the particular status offense to the family or 
community and the underlying reason why the minor committed the 
offense in the first place.
167
 
Additionally, community-based programs are beneficial because they 
provide a louder voice to status offenders. For example, mediation allows 
the child to communicate his or her opinions in the hopes of coming to a 
mutually agreeable rehabilitation plan, rather than being told by a parent or 
judge of his disposition.
168
 Other community-based programs require the 
status offender to sign a contract stating agreement with his or her 
rehabilitation plan.
169
 By signing this contract, the status offender 
acknowledges the offense and commits him or herself to certain actions, 
such as attending counseling or other related programs. The practice of 
having status offenders sign a rehabilitation-related contract gives 
offenders a sense of ownership over their progress.
170
 Although the 
suggestion of taking status offenders out from under the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court system seems extreme, if successful, community-based 
alternatives offer many benefits including decreased court petitions and 
out-of-home placement, lower costs by keeping more youth at home 
 
 
 162. Kedia, supra note 31, at 562.  
 163. Id. at 562–64.  
 164. Kelly Browe Olson, The Importance of Using Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques and 
Processes in the Ethical and Informed Representation of Children, 6 NEV. L.J. 1333, 1334 (2006).  
 165. Id.  
 166. Kedia, supra note 31, at 563. For a detailed discussion on the use of mediation to address 
status offenders, see Simmons, supra note 31.  
 167. See Kedia, supra note 31, at 562; see supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting that youth 
may commit the status offense of running away because of mental, physical, or emotional abuse 
occurring at the home).  
 168. Simmons, supra note 31, at 1054. 
 169. KENDALL, supra note 161, at 19. 
 170. Id.  
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instead of costlier out-of-home placement or detainment, and reduced 
recidivism rates.
171
  
CONCLUSION 
The juvenile justice system in the United States has gone through many 
changes in its history. From an initial goal of rehabilitation, to a realization 
of the punitive nature of the juvenile courts, the juvenile justice system has 
granted youth offenders greater autonomy by providing procedural due 
process rights and protections and a voice in their adjudications. These 
rights, however, have not been extended to status offenders. The denial of 
rights and the lack of a voice in their adjudications has left status offenders 
vulnerable to the discretion and paternalism of juvenile court judges. 
Because there are no procedural safeguards in place, many judges impose 
their own views in the adjudication and disposition of status offenders 
which, in turn, leads to unequal and unpredictable results for many status 
offenders. To curb the broad discretion and paternalism demonstrated by 
some juvenile court judges, it is important that the rights and protections 
offered to juvenile delinquents be extended to status offenders, or 
alternatively, that status offenders be removed from the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile justice system. 
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